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Employee Rights in Sex Work: The




The legal sex industry1 in Minneapolis has boomed in recent
years,2 and will likely continue to grow.3 The number of women
* J.D., University of Minnesota Law School, expected 1997; B.A., St. Olaf Col-
lege, 1993. I gratefully acknowledge Sandra Conroy, Kent Klaudt, Sarah Garb and
Amy Chiericozzi for their thoughtful editing. I am especially thankful to Kelly Hol-
sopple and the entire staff of WHISPER, to whom this article is dedicated, for provid-
ing research materials and personal insight into the sex industry. Finally, I am
indebted to the partner of my life, David Fischer, who not only provided me with
infinite support and encouragement, but who sincerely understands why this article
needed to be written.
1. "Legal sex industry" refers to commercial facilities, bars or clubs, that fea-
ture strip shows, nude dancing, and other live entertainment for the sexual gratifica-
tion of their patrons. Sexually-oriented clubs typically feature female dancers
performing in various ways for an almost entirely male audience.
Although the specifics of a club's layout may differ, commonly women
circulate around the room engaging in what is called "table dancing"
(she stands on a small portable platform so that her crotch is at eye-
level with the customer) or "lap dancing" (she literally "sits" on the cus-
tomer's lap).
EVELINA GIOBBE, WHY WHISPER is OPPOSED TO STRIP CLUBS (1992) (pamphlet dis-
tributed by WHISPER Action Group) (on file with author). See infra note 41 for a
description of the organization WHISPER.
2. See Peter Leyden, From Eclectic to Sex District?, STAR Tam. (Minneapolis),
Dec. 29, 1993, at Al (discussing how the legal sex industry is growing in Minneapo-
lis' Warehouse District). Many sexually-oriented clubs are located in the Warehouse
District as a result of a 1986 City Council ordinance mandating that such establish-
ments pull out of other neighborhoods and locate downtown. Id. See infra note 26
and accompanying text (discussing zoning regulations for the legal sex industry).
"In all, the number of sexual-entertainment businesses in the Warehouse District is
pushing 10." Leyden, supra, at Al. Deja Vu, a prominent sexually-oriented busi-
ness featuring nude dancers, opened in the Warehouse District in the late 1980s. Id.
The club now known as Dream Girls began featuring topless dancers in 1992. Doug
Grow, Old Friends Took Off After Jukebox Owner Hired Topless Dancers, STAR TRmB.
(Minneapolis), Feb. 2, 1992, at B3.
3. See Tony Kennedy, Deja Vu Owner Eyes Third Nude Dancing Club: Also
Signs Letter of Intent to Buy Bar Next Door, STAR Tam. (Minneapolis), June 27, 1995,
at Dl. The prospective club, Darlings Entertainment Inc., would be a non-alcoholic
juice bar featuring nude dancing with a bar serving alcohol next door. Id.
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working4 as nude or semi-nude dancers has consequently in-
creased. The sex industry is inextricably connected to national and
local economies, 5 and may offer a woman more income than she
would earn elsewhere.0 Nonetheless, within this "profession" wo-
4. The use of language such as "work" or "employment" is not intended to imply
that participation in the sex industry is a purely commercial exchange.
5. Foy example, Rides~ Cabaret, a Hoston "gtntlemen'a tlub," recently became
the first publicly traded strip club in the history of the stock market when it offered
1.6 million shares on the Nasdaq. Jesse Katz, Strip Club's Debut on Nasdaq Reveals
New Era of Legitimacy, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 13, 1995, at A16. "During a good month,
Rick's may pay out nearly $30,000 in liquor taxes alone." Id.
The sex industry draws a lot of business from local sports events. Colin Covert
& Neal Justin, Businesses Plan Huge Rally to Keep Wolves, STAR Tam. (Minneapo-
lis), May 27, 1994, at Bi; see also Chris Waddington, Super Bowl Traffic Expected to
Pick Up Pace of Sex Trade, STAR Tam. (Minneapolis), Jan. 21, 1992, at El.
In a letter to the Minneapolis City Council, an executive from a Twin Cities
investment firm recounted an outing with a client during which they stopped at
Solid Gold (a Minneapolis strip club now called Schiek's) for drinks after a
Timberwolves game: "Instead of staying for just one drink, the client chose to stay
for several hours and during that time we negotiated on a very large multimillion-
dollar joint venture." Jill Hodges, Doing in Doing Lunch: Women Articulate Growing
Concerns About Noon-Hour Adult Entertainment, STAR TRm. (Minneapolis), Jan. 26,
1995, at D1, D7. "The Greater Minneapolis Hospitality Council said Solid Gold adds
a dimension to the 'entertainment community' that is critical if Minneapolis is to be
billed as a 'world-class convention city.'" Id.
The sex industry also has strong relationships with politicians and other com-
munity leaders. Doug Grow, War on Porn May be More Political than You Think,
STAR TRIS. (Minneapolis), Feb. 3, 1995, at B3. For example, "[Tihe [Minneapolis]
City Council once quietly encouraged Solid Gold, a topless bar now called Schiek's, to
open downtown." Id. "And many local politicians are happy to accept the campaign
contributions of Robert Sabes, owner of Schiek's." Id. Such participation in local
and national economies offers the sex industry social legitimization. On the other
hand, the connection of the sex industry with business has raised concerns in Minne-
apolis. Hodges, supra, at D1, D7 (discussing Minneapolis businesswomen's concerns
about the growing trend of conducting business meetings at sexually-oriented clubs).
6. American women face great challenges in earning their living. "In 1991 em-
ployed women working full-time, year-round had average earnings that amounted to
only 70 percent of the average earnings for men employed fiul-time, yemr-munm."
COMMISSION ON THE EcONOMIC STATUS OF WOMEN, PAY EQUITY: TuE MINNESOTA Ex-
PERIENCE 4 (1994). The pay gap between women's and men's salaries is largely due
to occupational segregation; most employed women perform lower-paying work. Id.
"The wage gap continues because women do 'women's work' and 'women's work' is
low paid." Id.
Sources disagree as to how much income a woman can earn through prostitution
and other forms of sex work. Women often perform sex work under individualized
coercion, where most of their "earnings" are expropriated by a pimp. See KATHLEEN
BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVvRY 96 (1984) ("Prostitution is not the economic alterna-
tive for women that many have believed it to be. The money a woman makes is
usually not her own. The pimp takes most or all of it."); see also infra note 171
(explaining that nude dancers also often work for agents/pimps, who likely control
most or all of their income). On the other hand, according to some reports, sex work
may provide women a high-income alternative to low-paying jobs. See infra note 77
and accompanying text (discussing the income potential of nude dancing); see also
infra text accompanying note 114. "I absolutely hate it when they say: 'And what's a
nice girl like you doing a job like this for?' I always feel like saying: 'Earning four
times as much as you do!' Because it's true." Barbara, It's a Pleasure Doing Busi-
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men are denied legal protections relating to the terms and condi-
tions under which they earn their livings. Most dancers are hired
to work as "independent contractors" rather than "employees."7
Whether workers are employees or independent contractors can
have a tremendous impact on their lives. Classification as in-
dependent contractors effectively denies them the rights and pro-
tections afforded those workers defined as employees under the
law.8 Dancers are not paid any wages, instead earning all of their
income from customer tips.9 Sometimes the dancers themselves
have to pay for the right to work at a club.1o As independent con-
tractors, they are not entitled to file discrimination claims, receive
unemployment benefits or workers' compensation.L Club owners
are free from tax obligations and potential tort liability based on
respondeat superior with respect to these workers.12
Litigation on this issue has sprouted nationally in recent
years.' 3 In Minneapolis, women working as dancers in the sex in-
dustry have brought at least two lawsuits against nightclub own-
ers.' 4 While both lawsuits were settled,15 in one a jury found that
the dancers were employees and were thus entitled to back
wages. 16
This article argues that women who dance nude in night-
clubs,17 though ostensibly hired as independent contractors, are
employees as a matter of law. As such, they are entitled to certain
legal protections. In its reluctance to embrace legal endorsement of
sexually-oriented work, American society has been slow to acknowl-
ness With You, SocIL TXT, Winter 1993, at 11, 13 (Barbara is an escort worker in
Great Britain).
7. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 80-88 and accompanying text (discussing differences in legal
rights and obligations with regard to independent contractors and employees).
9. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 80-81, 87 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 80, 85 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., infra part I.D.3.
14. Dancers filed suit under Minnesota's Fair Labor Standards Act against Deja
Vu in 1994. Panel to Set Deja Vu Settlement: Attorneys to Consider How Much to
Award, STAR TRm. (Minneapolis), Nov. 17, 1994, at B2 [hereinafter Panel]; Mark
Brunswick, Jury: Deja Vu Dancers are Club Employees: Ruling Yet to Come on Pay,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Nov. 15, 1994, at B1; Matt Nelson, Deja Vu Dancers Say
Club Violated Independent Contract, STAR TRm. (Minneapolis), Oct. 25, 1994, at B2.
Dancers filed a similar lawsuit against Solid Gold in 1991. Id.
15. Panel, supra note 14, at B2; Nelson, supra note 14, at B2.
16. Brunswick, supra note 14, at B1.
17. This article will only address that part of the sex industry which involves
females performing for male audiences. This article will not specifically address po-
tentially overlapping issues arising from sexual entertainment targeted at a homo-
sexual or bisexual audience.
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edge that these women are denied their workplace rights. Granting
sex workers their legal rights as employees will help to mitigate the
harms they experience as "throwaway women."18
Part I of this article explains how the Supreme Court has held
that nude dancing is entitled to First Amendment protection. 19
The harmful nature of work in the sex industry is then discussed.
Part I also analyzes the legal consequences of the employee/in-
dependent contractor distinction and defines the criteria for deter-
mining whether a particular worker is an employee or an
independent contractor. Finally, the approaches of other jurisdic-
tions to the employee/independent contractor distinction within the
context of sex industry work are examined.
Part II argues that under this legal framework, dancers in the
sex industry are employees rather than independent contractors.
Part II then analyzes the consequences of this conclusion. Success-
ful litigation for sex workers' rights as employees would entitle sex
workers to greater legal protection, but it may also elevate nude
dancing to legal recognition as a "profession."20 Part II thus consid-
ers whether seeking employee status for sex workers is a desirable
goal in light of the inherently harmful nature of the sex industry,
described in Part I.
Part II also considers the reasons society has been hesitant to
address the employment rights of women working in the sex indus-
try. This article considers whether litigating for the rights of sex
18. See BARRY, supra note 6, at 124 (discussing how prostituted women are ren-
dered "throwaway women" to society).
Having such a class of dispensable persons serves a function in society.
"[Dieviant persons often supply an important service to society by patrolling the
outer edges of group space and by providing a contrast which gives the rest of the
community some sense of their own territorial identity." Neil L. Shumsky, Tacit
Acceptance: Respectable Americans and Segregated Prostitution, 1870-1910, 19 J.
Soc. HIsT. 665, 671 (1985/1986) (quoting Kai Erikson). Many Americans believed
(and some still believe) that having "throwaway" women available to serve men's
needs prevented "respectable" women from being attacked. Id. "The only remaining
option, if the wives, mothers, daughters, and sisters of respectable Americans were
to be protected, was to provide an arena for the deployment and control of other
men's sexuality." Id. See also Margaret Baldwin, Split at the Root: Prostitution and
Feminist Discourses of Law Reform, 5 YALE J.L. & FEmNISM 47, 48-49 (1992) (dis-
cussing how feminists have dismissed prostitutes as the "other"). "What is lost in
the prostitution debate.., is what other women need to learn and know and appreci-
ate and politicize about the conditions of their own existence from women in prosti-
tution." Id.
19. See infra part I.A.1.
20. This statement is not meant to deny the fact that calling dancers independ-
ent contractors still implies that their relationship with club owners has a purely
commercial base. The concern in granting dancers legal recognition as employees is
that such recognition will only partially address the problems faced by sex workers.
See infra notes 186-87 and accompanying text (discussing the dangers of partial
reform).
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workers will appropriately address the harms of the industry and,
specifically, whether such litigation will ultimately prove beneficial
for women in general, or whether it will simply further legitimize
an occupation many view as inherently dehumanizing and degrad-
ing for women. Ultimately, this article concludes that litigation on
behalf of sex workers to protect their rights as employees should be
pursued despite the risk of further legitimizing sex work as a pro-
fession. The risk of legitimization is outweighed by the fact that
employee status for sex workers can temper what many regard as
abuse per se.
I. Background
A Sex Industry Employment in Context
1. Obscenity Law and the First Amendment
In general, the First Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution prevents both the federal government and the states from
imposing an outright ban on material that a legislature might view
as offensive.2 1 In Barnes v. Glen Theatre,22 the Supreme Court
held in a plurality opinion that nude dancing is a form of speech
protected by the First Amendment. Federal and state governments,
therefore, are forbidden from entirely banning nude dancing or live
sexual entertainment.
The Court tempered this decision, however, by noting that
nude dancing is afforded only marginal protection.23 Thus, a state
may impose time, place, and manner regulations on nude danc-
ing.2 4 Specifically, the Court has held that a state may regulate the
nature of entertainment in bars and nightclubs to which the state
grants licenses to serve alcoholic beverages. 2 5 Courts have also up-
21. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973); Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629, 637-38 (1968).
22. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565 (1991).
23. In Barnes, the Court held that an Indiana statutory requirement that night-
club dancers must wear pasties and G-strings did not violate the First Amendment.
Id.
24. See California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972), reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 948
(1973) (holding that a state has authority under the Twenty-First Amendment to
prohibit nude dancing in establishments licensed to sell liquor); see generally The
Supreme Court, 1990 Term: State Restrictions on Nude Dancing, 105 HARv. L. REV.
287 (1991) (discussing Barnes); Lisa Malmer, Nude Dancing and the First Amend-
ment, 59 U. CiN. L. REV. 1275 (1991).
25. LaRue, 409 U.S. at 118-19; see also Knudtson v. City of Coates, 519 N.W.2d
166, 168 (Minn. 1994).
One St. Paul bar has found a solution to the city's ordinance banning alcohol in
clubs featuring nude dancing the Lamplighter owns two adjacent buildings sepa-
rated by a glass wall and serves alcohol in one with nude dancing visible next door.
Susan J. Berkson, If It Looks Like (And Exploits Like) A Strip Joint... : 'Sin Tour'
1996] 525
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held zoning restrictions 26 and requirements for distance between
dancers and patrons.27
2. Legal Contradictions in Sex Work Regulation
The judiciary and legislatures have historically placed sex
work in a nebulous legal position. The Supreme Court has estab-
lished that nude dancing may not be entirely prohibited, but legis-
lative bodies may nonetheless restrict some aspects of its
operation.28 In this manner the legal system succeeds in simulta-
neously legitimizing and condemning the industry.
The law's treatment of the legal sex industry is remarkably
similar to its historical treatment of traditional prostitution.29 As
with the legal sex industry, lawmakers have wavered between re-
strictive and permissive responses to traditional prostitution.3O For
example, the historical use of red-light districts bears a striking
similarity to today's zoning regulations for sexually-oriented busi-
nesses and clubs.31 This practice effectively tolerates the existence
of sex work while condemning it by limiting where it may occur. 32
Reveals A Minneapolis Industry Bent On Abusing Women, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis),
Aug. 7, 1994, at A25.
26. See Mga Susu, Inc. v. County of Benton, 853 F. Supp. 1147, 1154 (D. Minn.
1994) (finding a specific licensing requirement unconstitutional, but that zoning
power may be exercised within constitutional limits).
27. See, e.g., Key, Inc. v. Kitsap County, 793 F.2d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 1986).
28. See supra part IA.1.
29. For purposes of this article, the term "traditional prostitution" refers to
street prostitution, saunas, call girls, and escort services. Cf infra note 33 (detailing
Minnesota's statutory definition of prostitution).
30. See Priscilla Alexander, Prostitution: A Difficult Issue for Feminists, in SEx
WORK: WRITINGS BY WOMEN IN THE SEx INDUSTRY 184, 194-96 (Frederique Delacoste
& Priscilla Alexander eds., 1987) (discussing the historical treatment of prostitution
as wavering between restrictive and permissive); BARBARA MEI HOBSON, UNEASY
VIRTUE: THE POLITICS OF POSTTrrUTION AND THE AMERICAN REr'ORm TRADITION 4
(1987) ("The American response [to prostitution] has been one of radical swings in
policy between all-out campaigns against prostitution and sufferance of its exist-
ence."); JOHN DECKER, PROSTITUTION: REGULATION AND CONTROL 57-62, 67-78, 81-92
(1979) (discussing historical treatment of prostitution in the Uaited States). See
generally THOMAS C. MACKEY, RED LIGHTS OUT: A LEGAL HISTORY OF PROSTITUTION,
DISORDERLY HousEs, AND VICE DISTRICTS (1987) (analyzing the historical legal re-
sponse to prostitution).
31. DECKER, supra note 30, at 61 (discussing use of red-light districts in regulat-
ing prostitution in the United States). "Many cities tolerated the presence of prosti-
tutes as long as they confined themselves to certain 'red-light' districts even though
these women were technically in violation of the law." Id.; see also infra note 36
(discussing how red-light districts were used to maintain segregation between mem-
bers of "resectable7 society mnd prostitutesI.
32. DECKER, supra note 30, at 61. "This ambivalent approach to prostitution
might be explained in part by a class conflict between women which was caused by
their subordinate roles in a male-dominated society." Id.
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3. Society's Hypocrisy Toward the Sex Industry
The American legal system has thus accepted the existence of
sex work but has struggled with how to respond to it. American
lawmakers have classified some forms of sex work as illegal prosti-
tution.33 Other forms of sex work, such as nude dancing, are enti-
tled to legal protection.34 Often the distinction seems arbitrary.35
This legal ambivalence toward sex work is a reflection of soci-
ety's ambivalence and discomfort with sex work. Sexually-oriented
clubs, though legal, are viewed as subversive and subcultural.36
33. In Minnesota, the definition of prostitution requires penetration or sexual
contact. MINN. STAT. § 609.321(9) (1995). "'Prostitution' means engaging or offering
or agreeing to engage for hire in sexual penetration or sexual contact." Id. "Sexual
contact" is further defined as "any of the following acts, if the acts can reasonably be
construed as being for the purpose of satisfying the actor's sexual impulses: (i) The
intentional touching by an individual of a prostitute's intimate parts; or (ii) The
intentional touching by a prostitute of another individual's intimate parts." Id.
§ 609.321(10). "Sexual penetration" is defined as
any of the following acts, if for the purpose of satisfying sexual im-
pulses: sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or
any intrusion however slight into the genital or anal openings of an
individual's body by any part of another individual's body or any object
used for the purpose of satisfying sexual impulses. Emission of semen
is not necessary.
Id. § 609.321(11).
34. See supra part I.A.1.
35. Contrary to a typical statutory definition, a common sense understanding of
prostitution is not limited to penetration or sexual contact. Sarah H. Garb, Sex for
Money is Sex for Money: The Illegality of Pornographic Film as Prostitution, 13 LAw
& INEQ. J. 281, 298 (1995); cf supra note 33 (outlining Minnesota's statutory defini-
tion of prostitution). For example, if a man brought a prostitute to his hotel room
and asked her to masturbate for him to observe in exchange for money, most people
would deem that prostitution. Garb, supra, at 298.
The common sense understanding of prostitution therefore seems to center on a
general notion of exchange of money for sexual services or gratification. Under this
perspective of prostitution, nude dancing for the sexual gratification of club patrons
clearly is a form of prostitution despite the fact that it does not explicitly fit into the
Minnesota statutory definition of prostitution because it does not by definition re-
quire sexual contact or penetration.
Dave Chuzzle, manager of the Foxy Lady nightclub in Providence, Rhode Island,
described one of the private nude dances offered by the club as the "friction dance,"
and stated, "In other parts of the country, they do a full-on friction dance where the
girl will literally rub the whole front of her body up against the customer... In fact,
some community activists call these private dances the stepsisters of prostitution."
Dateline: The Naked Truth? (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 28, 1995) (transcript on
file with author) [hereinafter Dateline]. Though this "dance" does not seem to entail
penetration, certainly it incorporates sexual contact exchanged for money. In this
same interview, however, Chuzzle asserted, "Prostitution is a severe crime .... We
don't want to be associated with that." Id.
36. Though these clubs claim to be respectable and conventional, most do not put
their names on their credit card receipts. Dateline, supra note 35. On receipts from
the Foxy Lady, the name "Gulliver's Tavern" appears. Id.
The societal mystique surrounding sexually-oriented clubs is likely fueled by
laws regulating aspects of their operation, including time, place, and manner restric-
tions. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text (discussing these restrictions).
1996]
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Society perceives women working as sexual entertainers as "bad
girls,"37 yet simultaneously encourages women to enter into sex
work through economic demand for the industry.38 This stereotyp-
ing creates a class of marginalized and forgotten women. Nude
dancers become "throwaway" women, who are dispensable and
available for whimsical sexual access, rather than human beings
with human needs.39
Though feminists recognize that sex work predominantly af-
fects women, they are divided both in their perspectives on sex
work and in how they believe the legal system should respond to
it.40 Some feminists view prostitution as a systematic form of op-
pression that must be eliminated.41 Other feminists assert that
they have a right to engage in prostitution.42 The different perspec-
That society deems sex work as deviant is apparent in historical responses to it. For
example, in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, American cities
zoned prostitution into particular areas "to avoid contaminating respectable neigh-
borhoods and to separate moral from immoral behavior." Shumsky, supra note 18,
at 671; see also HOBSON, supra note 30, at 25-27; supra note 31 and accompanying
text (discussing historical use of red-light districts to regulate prostitution).
37. As Margaret Baldwin explains, "'real women' do not combine sex with
money." Baldwin, supra note 18, at 48-49.
38. For an example of such economic encouragement in one city, see supra note 2
(discussing the growing economic role of the sex industry in Minneapolis).
39. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing the "throwaway wo-
man" perception).
40. See Priscilla Alexander, Why This Book?, in SEx WORK, supra note 30, at 14,
17 (discussing conflicting feminist views on sex work) [hereinafter Alexander, Why
This Book?].
41. WHISPER (Women Hurt in Systems of Prostitution Engaged in Revolt) is a
nationally-recognized organization comprised of both women who have survived the
sex industry and advocates concerned about commercial sex exploitation. Evelina
Giobbe & Sue Gibel, Impressions of a Public Policy Initiative, 16 HAMLmn J. PUB. L.
& PoL'y 1, 2 (1994). Founded in 1985, "WHISPER educates the public about prosti-
tution as a form of institutionalized violence that differentially impacts women and
youth and advocates for services to be made available to its victims." Id.
WHISPER recognizes that women do not enter into prostitution out of a free,
uncoerced choice to engage in a commercial transaction. See Evelina Giobbe, Con-
fronting the Liberal Lies About Prostitution, in SEXUAL LmE.RALs AND THE ATrACK ON
F'EmmsM 67 (Dorchen Leidholdt & Janice G. Raymond eds., 1990) [hereinafter
Giobbe, Confronting the Liberal Lies About Prostitution]. Giobbe challenges popular
myths about prostitution: "[Sexual liberal ideology] erroneously claims that prostitu-
tion is a career choice; that prostitution epitomizes women's sexual liberation; that
prostitutes set the sexual and economic conditions of their interactions with custom-
ers." Id.
Similarly, the U.S. Prostitutes Collective and related organizations see prostitu-
tion as primarily a class issue, arguing that "poverty forces poor women to work in
the sex industry." Alexander, Why This Book?, supra note 40, at 17. Such organiza-
tions believe that prostitution will disappear when women are able to earn sufficient
income without it. Id.
42. COYOTE (Call OffYour Old Tired Ethics), another nationally-recognized or-
ganization, is also largely comprised of prostitutes but, in contrast to WHISPER, the
position of COYOTE and similar organizations is that prostitution should be recog-
nized as legitimate work. Alexander, Why This Book?, supra note 40, at 17.
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tives often center on concerns about women's control and agency in
their sexuality.43 Issues of control and agency are particularly cen-
tral in nude dancing.44 Those feminists who categorize prostitution
as oppressive are beginning to incorporate nude dancing into their
definition of prostitution.45 For them, nude dancing is a form of
sexual exploitation that must be eliminated.
[Such organizations] work from the perspective that women have the
right to determine, for themselves, how they will use their bodies,
whether the issue is prostitution, abortion/reproductive rights, lesbian
rights, or the right to be celibate and/or asexual. We believe that most
of the problems associated with prostitution are directly related to the
prohibition and the related stigma associated with sex and especially
with sex work. While we consider the economic status of women to be a
major factor in the amount of prostitution in the world, we do not think
that economics is the only factor, nor do we believe that prostitution
would disappear altogether if classism, and the closely related caste
system of racism, disappeared.
Id.
43. COYOTE representatives firmly assert that a right to engage in prostitution
centers around women's right to control their sexuality. See id.
Legal responses to prostitution certainly may fail to adequately affirm female
sexual autonomy. Feminist scholars have argued that reform of the law's treatment
of other forms of violence against women has failed to respect women's agency.
Lynne Henderson, Getting to Know: Honoring Women in Law and in Fact, 2 TEx. J.
WOMEN & L. 41 (1993) (arguing that legal reform in rape law has failed to respect
women's agency, and advocating reconstruction of heterosexuality as a response).
44. As one dancer explained, "[dancing is] very empowering. I'm proud of the
fact that I'm good at what I do. I think of it as both a job and an art." Dateline,
supra note 35. But see Interview with Kelly Holsopple, WHISPER, in Minneapolis,
Minn. (Nov. 16, 1995) (explaining that dancers often present a picture to the outside
world that they are in control of their dancing and how such an image does not coin-
cide with the actual control dymanics within the sex industry); see also infra notes
139-43, 158-61 and accompanying text (discussing the extent to which club owners
actually .control dancers).
45. WHISPER has taken a strong stance against the legal sex industry viewing
it as a form of prostitution. WHISPER identifies stripping as sexual exploitation
and states "[sitripping usually involves prostitution and always involves sexual har-
assment and abuse." WHISPER, TEENS WHO HAvE SURVIVED PROSTrTUTION WANT
You TO KNow... TRIcxs AREN'T FOR KiDs (on file with author) (pamphlet developed
by teens used in prostitution). Founder Evelina Giobbe explains: "We define sys-
tems of prostitution as any industry in which women's or children's bodies are
bought, sold, or traded for sexual use and abuse. These systems include pornogra-
phy, live sex shows, peep shows, international sexual slavery, and prostitution as it
is commonly defined." Giobbe, Confronting the Liberal Lies About Prostitution,
supra note 41, at 67.
In its 1990 Resolution on Prostitution, the National Coalition Against Sexual
Assault (NCASA) identified prostitution "in all of its forms, including but not limited
to live sex shows, peep shows, escort services, street walking, table dancing, lap
dancing, stripping, telephone sex, sexual penetration, sexual torture, pornography
and prostitution as it is commonly known [as] sexual abuse and subordination of
women and children." NATIONAL COALrrIoN AGAINST SEXUAL ASSAULT, 1990 RESOLU-
TION ON PRosrrrTiON 5 (1990).
As a dancer straddled men seated on a sofa at the Dream Girls all-nude club in
Minneapolis, Giobbe watched the men stare at her genitals; "Look at their faces,
their body language. I was a prostitute. I know what that look is. 'Do me. Do me,
baby.' He is buying sexual access to her, visual or otherwise. If that's not prostitu-
19961 529
Law and Inequality
Society's ambivalence toward sex work directly affects those
who work in the sex industry. Because their work is legally legiti-
mized through First Amendment protection,46 women working as
dancers in the sex industry often do not view themselves as op-
pressed, nor do they view their work as exploitation akin to prosti-
tution. 47 This confusion fuels the fire of uncertainty that surrounds
sex workers' rights.48
tion, I don't know what is." Susan M. Barbieri, Quiet Revolution: Evelina Giobbe's
Own Experiences Led Her to Found WHISPER, a Group that Helps Prostitutes Leave
"the Life," ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Nov. 7, 1993, at G1, G6.
46. See supra part IA.1.
47. See Judy Helfand, Silence Again, in SEX WORK, supra note 30, at 99. Hel-
fand describes her own confusion about the nature of her work as a nude model and
topless dancer when she learned of a solicitation for contributions to an anthology by
women who have worked or are working in "the sex industry":
My stomach jumped. A book from a feminist press by women who
may have shared my feelings and experiences. I could read their writ-
ings. I could submit an article, too! Finally, a release from that sense
of isolation. Cleis Press has recognized this as an important area for
feminist discourse.
Then I read on: "massage parlors, encounter studios, escort serv-
ices, pornography, street prostitution, as well as other areas of sex
work." Another clench of the stomach as I saw that topless dancing
wasn't in there. Neither was nude modeling. Maybe my experiences
weren't really "sex industry." I couldn't waste people's time with my
writing because what I had done was too "tame"....
Then I affirmed, yes, I had been part of the sex industry. My denial
was part of what needed to be examined. I needed to share my exper-
iences if for no other reason than to find other women who felt the
same. In our own experience we hold the keys to deeper understanding
of the oppression of women in the world. Silence. Guilt. Isolation. I
needed to participate in breaking through these three barriers.
Id. at 99-100.
In addition to the mixed treatment by the law, dancers' reluctance to recognize
their work as exploitation is also fostered by their need to assert control and agency-
over their dancing. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing the control
dynamics in nude dancing).
48. Baldwin explains the conceptual challenge in understanding the sex worker
as exploited:
'Legitimate" work is, after all, the place where women are sup-
posed to make money, an assumption which has fueled anti-sexual har-
assment legal initiatives and education efforts. Here, [feminists']
advocacy stresses the distinction between a woman's willingness to
work and her willingness to have sex as part of the bargain, or to be
sexualized in her status as worker.
Baldwin, supra note 18, at 76.
Dancers' confusion about their legal rights as employees extends to all forms of
legal protection. This is similar to the fact that prostituted women often are unable
to pursue claims against perpetrators when they are assaulted or raped. One wo-
man described how a police officer refused to take a report after she was violently
raped: "Even though I am a prostitute, I feel I should still be entitled to protection
from the police." Karen, The Right to Protection from Rape, in SEX WORK, supra note
30, at 145, 146; see also Carole, Interview with Barbara, in SEX WORK, supra note 30,
at 166, 169 (discussing police and societal indifference toward prostitute rape and
murder). "The fate of a woman's claims on justice, we all seem to know somewhere,
crucially depends on her success in proving that she is not, and never has been, a
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B. The Facts of Sex Industry Employment: Typical Terms
and Conditions
Although specific job requirements may vary in sexually-ori-
ented clubs, many nude dancers relate similar stories about their
work experiences. 4 9 Most performers are hired to work as though
they are independent contractors5 O when, in reality, their relation-
ship to their supervisors is an employer-employee relationship. 5 1
In a typical hiring scenario, women respond in person to an
advertisement offering significant income for dancing, "no experi-
ence required."52 As an audition, the club often asks applicants to
perform on "amateur night."53 The club will make job offers based
on amateur night performances. 5 4 Clubs portray the job require-
ments as very flexible. Dancers are told that they will not be forced
to do anything they do not want to do and that they will work as
independent contractors. 55 Some club owners require applicants to
sign agreements indicating that they are working as independent
contractors. 5 6 Often applicants do not understand the legal impli-
prostitute." Baldwin, supra note 18, at 81. See also People v. Slovinski, 420 N.W.2d
145 (1988) (holding that evidence showing complainant was a prostitute is probative
on issue of consent where defendant was charged with criminal sexual conduct).
49. Available stories of dancers' experiences are likely to be contained in main-
stream media sources such as newspaper articles, see, e.g., Nelson, supra note 14, at
B2; Brunswick, supra note 14, at B1, or television segments. See, e.g., Dateline,
supra note 35. Analyses of sex work by outsiders, journalists or scholars who have
not themselves performed sex work are not likely to be accurate or complete. One
master's degree student conducted comprehensive interviews of current and former
sex workers and noted that their stories generally did not coincide with accounts of
those purporting to be academic "experts" on sex work. Kari Lerum, Is it Exploita-
tive if I Like it? Commercial Sex Workers Compare Notes with Feminists and the
Social Problems Industry (1993) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Washing-
ton). "[Wihen compared to the words of the women I interviewed, it seems that ex-
perts often present a disproportionate view of commercial sex work. Just as some
map makers inflate Europe and deflate Africa, sex industry map makers magnify
and diminish aspects of sex work, according to their agenda." Id. at 26. This article
only considers one facet of dancers' experience, namely the distinction between em-
ployee and independent contractor, and does not claim to present a complete picture
of the dynamics of sex work.
50. GiOBBE, supra note 1 ("In the majority [of clubs] a woman must pay the man-
agement for the 'privilege' of working there as an 'independent contractor.' "); Inter-
view with Kelly Holsopple, supra note 44.
51. See infra part II.A-B. (explaining how dancers' relationships with club own-
ers indicates that they are employees rather than independent contractors).
52. Interview with Kelly Holsopple, supra note 44.
53. Id. Holsopple noted that this is a particularly popular night for customers,
who hope to see "girl-next-door" types rather than seasoned strippers. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See Martin v. Priba Corp., C.A. No. 3:91-CV-2786-G, 1992 WL 486911 at *1
(N.D. Tex., Nov. 6, 1992). Before hiring a dancer, the defendant club in this case
required that she sign an "independent contracting agreement." Id.
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cations arising from independent contractor status,5 7 but accept the
job as an independent contractor out of a belief that they can avoid
paying taxes.5 8 Additionally, many clubs require applicants to sign
a waiver of their right to sue the club for any reason.5 9 Most clubs
do not pay dancers a regular wage.6 0 Club owners do not pay taxes
or unemployment or workers' compensation taxes on behalf of the
dancers working for them.61
Regardless of such up-front agreements claiming independent
contractor status, clubs maintain a significant amount of control
over the performers they hire. Club supervisors typically control
the hours dancers are scheduled to work62 and maintain policies
about missing scheduled shifts.63 Supervisors may estimate danc-
ers' earnings from customer tips and require dancers to pay a per-
centage back to the club, or dancers may have to pay a "stage rental
fee."6 4
57. Interview with Kelly Holsopple, supra note 44. See infra notes 80-88 and
accompanying text (discussing the legal implications for independent contractors
and employees).
58. Interview with Kelly Holsopple, supra note 44. Holsopple explained that
when clubs told her that she was hired as an independent contractor, she used to
think, "that means I don't have to pay taxes. Sure I was comfortable with it." Id.
Holsopple also noted that clubs often did not ask to see her identification or confirm
her Social Security number. Id.
59. Id. Many applicants do not realize that such waivers are not legally binding
if the club violates their legal rights. "An employee is not permitted to waive em-
ployee status." Jeffcoat v. State Dep't of Labor, 732 P.2d 1073, 1077 (Alaska 1987)
(citing Robicheaux v. Radcliff Material, Inc., 697 F.2d 662, 667 (5th Cir. 1983)).
60. Interview with Kelly Holsopple, supra note 44; see also Martin, 1992 WL
4869 11 at *1 (dancers' sole source of income was tips from customers for stage per-
formances or private table dances).
Holsopple recalled a few exceptions and noted that a performer may receive ad-
ditional compensation if she is the "feature act" or if she has appeared in porno-
graphic films. Interview with Kelly Holsopple, supra note 44.
61. Nelson, supra note 14, at B2; Berkson, supra note 25, at A25 ('Labeling the
women independent contractors means management pays no Social Security, no
health insurance, no life insurance, no FICA, nothing."); see also Thomas J. Dwyer,
That Control Thing: Employment Status of Worker Defines Tax Obligation, 79 A.B.A.
J. 90 (June 1993) ("The general formula is that an employee costs the employer
about a third more in taxes and benefits than the stated salary."); infra notes 80-83.
62. See Reich v. Circle C. Inv., Inc., 998 F.2d 324, 327 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding
that club compiled weekly work schedules); Jeffcoat, 732 P.2d at 1076 (finding that
club controlled the working hours of the dancers).
63. See Reich, 998 F.2d at 327 (finding that club fined dancers for absences and
tardiness).
64. In fact, dancers generally are required to turn over to the club up to 40% of
their tips at the end of the night. "The majority of clubs require that women turn
over as much as 40% of their income to cover 'services' provided by busboys, bartend-
ers, and bouncers." Giobbe, supra note 1; see Reich, 998 F.2d at 326. The dancers in
Reich were required to pay the club twenty dollars at the end of each night. Id. "The
defendants characterize this 'tip-out' as stage rental and argue that the dancers are
merely 'tenants.' According to the defendants, the dancers are... business women
renting space, stages, music, dressing rooms, and lights from [the club]." Id. at 326-
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In addition to these restrictions, many clubs also regulate the
dancers' actual performance. A club may require a dancer to per-
form a certain number or type of dances65 and participate in group
dances or events. 66 Even table dances and other private dances
may be controlled.67 Often the dancers are not allowed to choose
the music to which they perform.68 Even if the dancers provide
their own costumes, a club may have specific rules about perform-
ing attire.69 A club may even impose requirements on dancers' per-
sonal grooming, requiring them to trim their pubic hair and have a
tan.70
Many clubs enforce rules about dancers' behavior even when
they are not actually dancing before an audience. At the beginning
of a show, the dancers may be required to stand on stage and be
introduced to the crowd.71 A club may require dancers to circulate
among the patrons soliciting private dances throughout the danc-
ers' scheduled shifts.72 Clubs also exert significant control over
27; see also Martin, 1992 WL 486911 at *1 (recounting that dancers were required to
pay a thirty-five dollar "adminstrztive feel. Sutx arrangements Us izaly rMeau
dancers are paying the club for the right to work there.
65. See Jeffcoat, 732 P.2d at 1076. In Jeffcoat, while the dancers chose their
specific dance steps, each was required to perform three dances onstage each shift.
"[The first dance was to be performed fully clothed, the second dance involved re-
moval of some item(s) of clothing, and the third dance was to be done while topless."
Id.
66. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for Partial Sum-
mary Judgment at 5, Davis v. Deja Vu (D. Minn. 1994) (No. CT 92-010727) [herein-
after Plaintiffs' Memorandum] (explaining that dancers were required to perform
group and "mystery dances").
67. "Even the table dances were controlled; dancers were to strip to their waists,
and only to their waists, and cotld not wear bikinis." Jeffcoat, 732 P.2d at 1076; see
also Reich, 998 F.2d at 327 (recounting that dancers were required to charge at least
ten dollars for table dances and twenty dollars for couch dances).
68. See Jeffcoat, 732 P.2d at 1076. In this case, not only was performance music
left to the club's discretion, but club rules dictated that the disc jockey could play
whatever music he wanted and that the dancers were not to complain. Id.; see also
Reich, 998 F.2d at 327 (recounting that dancers can only express preferences for
music and have no final say).
69. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 66, at 5 (dancers required to dance to-
tally nude and the club retains control over the timing and sequence of nudity). The
club in Jeffcoat required its dancers to wear dresses on weekends and country/west-
ern gear on Wednesdays. 732 P.2d at 1076; see also Reich, 998 F.2d at 327 (explain-
ing that dancers were required to supply their own costumes which had to meet
standards set by the club and were not allowed to wear flat heels).
70. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 66, at 5-6.
71. See Reich, 998 F.2d at 327 (recounting that all dancers were required to be
"'on the floor'" at opening time).
72. See Jeffcoat, 732 P.2d at 1076-77. In Jeffcoat, when not dancing, dancers
encouraged patrons to drink and to buy them drinks. Id. Dancers accrued a penny
for each $5.00 billed to a customer, and the club awarded better shifts to those earn-
ing the most pennies. Id. Because the dancers performed approximately one hour in
each eight hour shift, they spent the vast majority of their time circulating among
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dancers' behavior during their shifts, such as regulating what they
are allowed to drink and how many of them may be in the restroom
at one time.73 As with absence or tardiness, a club may enforce
these rules through fines.74
Despite the club's initial representation of a dancing job as
flexible, dancers attest that their relationship with the club be-
comes all-consuming.7 5 Not only do dancers spend a majority of
their hours each week at the club, but their work typically has sig-
nificant effects on their personal lives and well-being.76
Many dancers indicate that they are able to make a lot of
money from performing in sexually-oriented clubs. 77 Although
the crowd either table dancing or soliciting pennies, in effect, selling liquor for the
club. Id.
73. The rules of the club in Jeffcoat offer an example of such regulations:
Should a dancer's friend have visited during a period when the dancer
was offstage, the friend had to buy the dancer a drink. The dancers
could only drink house drinks during working hours, and no complaints
could be made about the drinks unless, for example, the glass was
chipped. The women were also required to finish the drinks.
Jeffcoat, 732 P.2d at 1076; see also Reich, 998 F.2d at 327 (explaining that club al-
lowed only one dancer in the restroom at a time and no more than 15 minutes at one
time in the dressing room); Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 66, at 6 (explaining
that dancers were not allowed to use the bathroom whenever they wanted).
74. See Reich, 998 F.2d at 327.
75. Despite the common perception that a woman can dance to earn her way
through school, many dancers report that their jobs essentially take over their lives.
"You're sleeping half of the day and then going to work at night. You're just a com-
plete vampire." Dateline, supra note 35 (interview with a former dancer named
Kaylee). Clubs often structure dancers' hours in a way that uniquely burdens their
lives. Holsopple explained that clubs often schedule a dancer to work with several
hours off between her working shifts; for example, she might be scheduled to perform
between two and four o'clock, and then again from six o'clock until midnight. Inter-
view with Kelly Holsopple, supra note 44. Rather than leave the club premises dur-
ing the interim, the dancer will most likely remain there and perhaps mingle with
the customers. Id. In this manner the club is able to book longer periods of dancers'
time without having to compensate them for doing so.
76. As one dancer explained, "I've never seen a girl go into dancing involved in a
relationship and leave dancing, with that same relationship. It destroys them."
Dateline, supra note 35.
"In my clinical experience, all prostitutes suffer from serious psychological dam-
age." Melissa Farley, How Prostitution Cripples Emotions, S.F. EXAMMIER, May 31,
1995, at A15.
Statistics can't provide a picture of the devastating psychological ef-
fects. To work as a prostitute, it is necessary to shut down emotion-
ally.... This provides psychological protection, in much the same way
a political prisoner protects himself during torture. Over time, it be-
comes difficult for someone to switch back. The emotionally distanced
self takes over more and more of the private self.
Id. (Melissa Farley is a clinical psychologist in San Francisco).
77. Holsopple acknowledged that she was able to earn her living through sex
work. Interview with Kelly Holsopple, supra note 44. "I always paid my rent... I
have a car... I supported a drug habit." Id. She attested that dancers were always
aware of their inability to find "straight" jobs because of their lack of education. Id;
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dancers may earn a high income as independent contractors, if they
are actually employees as a matter of law, their legal rights are be-
ing violated.
C. Employees and Independent Contractors
1. What's the Difference?
There is no simple or universally applicable definition of either
"independent contractor" or "employee."78 Nonetheless, distin-
guishing between the two categories has a number of important
legal implications for both the worker and the hiring party.79 An
employer incurs legal obligations with respect to employees for tax
purposes,8 0 worker's compensation,8 1 retirement benefits,82 unem-
see supra note 6 (discussing the economic disadvantages women as a group face in
the workforce); see also infra note 114 and accompanying text (describing how attor-
neys for club owners claim that dancers earn up to $500 each night).
78. The common law doctrine of master and servant does provide a starting point
for understanding the relationship between employer and worker. Phyllis Karasov,
How to Distinguish Independent Contractors from Employees, in INDEPENDENT CON-
TRACTRS vs. EMPLOYEES § II (Minn. St. Bar. Ass'n ed., 1992). This doctrine is set
forth in the Restatement (Second) of Agency, which characterizes a servant as subject
to another's control or right to control; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220
(1958); see infra note 89 and accompanying text.
79. See generally Rita A. McConnell, Defining the Employment Relationship, in
EMvLOYMENT LAW AND PRACTicE 47 (Stephen F. Befort & Karen G. Schanfield eds.,
1995) (discussing worker status).
80. The employer must withhold federal and state income tax from an em-
ployee's wages. 26 I.R.C. § 3401 (West 1989 & Supp. 1995). The employer must pay
federal and state payroll taxes. See, e.g., Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26
U.S.C.A. § 3301 (West 1989 & Supp. 1995). The employer must also withhold the
employee's share of the FICA tax from wages. Federal Insurance Contributions Act,
26 U.S.C.A. § 3101 (West 1989 & Supp. 1995). The employer must report an em-
ployee's wages to the IRS and to the employee on IRS Form W-2. McConnell, supra
note 79, at 54.
If, instead, a worker is an independent contractor, the employer has none of
these obligations. Id. The employer must submit an IRS Form 1099 for each worker
it pays more than $600 per year. Id. "The worker is liable for federal and state
income taxes on amounts received from the company and for federal self-employ-
ment tax." Id. at 54-55; see Dwyer, supra note 61, at 90; John Aramburu, How the
IRS Misapplies the Common Law Test When Classifying Workers as Employees, 60
TAx NOTES 663 (1993).
An employer who incorrectly classifies employees as independent contractors
may be liable for past-due taxes, including interest and penalties. McConnell, supra
note 79, at 57; 26 I.R.C. § 3509(a), (c) (West 1989 & Supp. 1995); MNN. STAT. ANN.
§ 289A.31(5Xb) (West 1989 & Supp. 1996); see also Amy S. Cohen, IRS Cracking
Down on Worker Misclassification, Practitioner Says, 65 Tx NOTES 1248 (1994).
81. Under the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act, "an employer is liable for
compensation in every case of personal injury or death of an employee arising out of
and in the course of employment." McConnell, supra note 79, at 58; MuTN. STAT.
ANN. § 176.021(1) (West 1993 & Supp. 1996); see Guhlke v. Roberts Truck Lines, 128
N.W.2d 324 (Minn. 1964); Hemmerling v. Happy Cab Co., 530 N.W.2d 916 (Neb.
1995) (holding that cab driver was an employee of a cab company and entitled to
workers' compensation benefits for injuries sustained while driving cab); see also
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ployment compensation8 3 and protection from workplace hazards.84
An employer may be held liable for torts committed by an employee
under the doctrine of respondeat superior.85 An employer is re-
quired to follow laws governing employee wages and benefits.86 In
addition, a worker falling under the definition of employee gains
protection under federal discrimination statutes.8 7 Finally, em-
Theodore Postel, Workers' Comp: Employee or Independent Contractor?, Cm. DAILY
L. BULL., Feb. 2, 1995, at 1; Michelle M. Lasswell, Workers' Compensation: Determin-
ing the Status of a Worker as an Employee or an Independent Contractor, 43 DRAKE
L. RFv. 419 (1994).
82. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) provides em-
ployee rights and remedies for pension and welfare plans. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1461
(West 1985 & Supp. 1995).
83. Speaks, Inc. v. Jensen, 243 N.W.2d 142, 144 (Minn. 1976); Lewis v. Commis-
sioner of Jobs & Training, 425 N.W.2d 309 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); Wise v. Denesen
Insulation Co., 387 N.W.2d 477, 479 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
84. Employees are protected from workplace hazards under federal and state oc-
cupation health and safety laws and regulations. James B. Platt, Background to the
Independent Contractor/Employee Classification Dispute, in INDEPENDENT CONTRAC-
TORS VS. EMPLOYEES, supra note 78, § I, at 4.
85. "Once it is determined that the man at work is a servant, the master becomes
subject to vicarious liability for his torts." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON TORTS § 70 (5th ed. 1984); see McKee v. Brimmer, 39 F.2d 94 (5th Cir.
1994). In McKee, a third party motorist brought an action against a pulpwood com-
pany for injuries sustained in a collision between the motorist and a vehicle owned
by a logging company. Id. The court held that the owner of the logging company
was an independent contractor, rather than an employee of the pulpwood company
which had hired him to haul timber, and thus found that the pulpwood company was
not liable. Id; see also Jones v. Century Oil U.S.A., Inc., 957 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1992)
(involving locksmith who brought tort suit against oil corporation for personal inju-
ries caused by tenant while locksmith attempted to remove locks from service sta-
tion); Clark v. Container Corp. of America, Inc., 936 F.2d 1220 (11th Cir. 1991)
(involving subcontractor's employee who sued plant owner for injuries); Johns v. Jar-
rard, 927 F.2d 551 (1lth Cir. 1991) (involving wrongful death action against hospital
for surgeon's actions); Stone v. Pinkerton Farms, Inc., 741 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1984)
(involving personal injury action against grain elevator for injuries caused by truck-
ing company); Newcomb v. North East Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1983) (in-
volving widow who sued courier's destination for death caused by courier).
86. Under federal law the applicable statute is the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C.A. § 230. State law also governs wages and benefits. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 177
& 181 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996).
87. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C-A. § 2000e(b), (f)
(West 1989 & Supp. 1995); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 621 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 12111(4), (5) (West 1995); see also Knight v. United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.,
950 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1991) (affirming district court's decision denying Title VII
protection in a sex discrimination claim based on the independent contractor status
of the claimant).
Independent contractors have no claim under the Minnesota Human Rights
Act's anti-discrimination in employment provisions. ME-N. STAT. ANN. § 363.01
(West 1991 & Supp. 1996). However, "[a] related provision of the Act prohibits the
intentional refusal to do business or contract with an individual on the basis of race,
color, sex or disability, and prohibits discrimination in the basic terms, conditions or
performance of the contract on those same grounds." McConnell, supra note 79, at
62; MuIN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(8a) (West 1991 & Supp. 1996). "This provision may
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ployees have the right to organize and engage in collective bargain-
ing over the terms and conditions of their employment.8 8
2. Tests to Determine Whether a Worker is an Employee
or an Independent Contractor
a. Common Law Test
The most frequently used test for determining whether a
worker is an employee or an independent contractor is the common
law test summarized in the Restatement ofAgency.89 The Supreme
Court looked to the Restatement in formulating its modification of
the common law test.90 In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Darden, the United States Supreme Court held that where a stat-
ute lacks a helpful definition of the term employee, the common law
test, as stated in Nationwide, should be applied.9 1 Examples of
provide a cause of action in state court to the independent contractor who is outside
the scope of Title VII." McConnell, supra note 79, at 62.
88. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947,29 U.S.CA § 141 (West 1973). The
LMRA specifically exempts independent contractors from coverage. 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 152, cited in Karasov, supra note 78, at 7.
89. The Restatement test is set forth as follows:
(1) A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of
another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the perform-
ance of the services is subject to the other's control or right to control.
(2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an
independent contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are
considered:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may
exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occu-
pation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the local-
ity, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a
specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workerman [sic] supplies the in-
strumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the
work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is part of the regular business of the
employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation
of master and servant; and
Q) whether the principal is or is not in business.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).
90. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992) (holding that
whether employer could disqualify worker for benefits depended on whether worker
was an "employee" under ERISA definition).




such statutes include the Internal Revenue Code and the National
Labor Relations Act.92
In both the Restatement and the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of it, the most significant element in determining whether a
worker is an employee is the employer's right to control the
worker's performance. This right to control is determined by con-
sidering a number of factors.93
Minnesota courts have adopted an abbreviated version of the
common law test and emphasize five factors to determine whether a
worker is an independent contractor or an employee: (1) the right
to control the means and manner of performance; (2) the mode of
payment; (3) the furnishing of material or tools; (4) the control of
the premises where the work is done; and (5) the right of the em-
ployer to discharge.94 The most important factor is the employer's
right of control over the worker.95
Determining whether a worker is an employee invokes ques-
tions of both fact and law. 96 The way in which the employment re-
lationship is classified by either the hiring party or the worker is
not determinative; instead courts make the determination by exam-
ining the actual conduct of the parties.97
92. Karasov, supra note 78, at 8. See also infra note 98 (regarding the applica-
tion of the common law test to the National Labor Relations Act).
93. See supra note 89 (outlining the Restatement test, which lists the right to
control as the first consideration, followed by an enumeration of factors to determine
whether control over a worker exists). The Supreme Court listed the relevant factors
in modifying the common law test:
[The relevant factors include] the skill required; the source of the in-
strumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the
relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the
right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the
hired party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method of
payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants;
whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party;
whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee bene-
fits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989).
94. Speaks, Inc. v. Jenseii, 243 N.W.2d 142, 144 (Minn. 1976) (citing Guhlke v.
Roberts Truck Lines, 128 N.W.2d 324 (Minn. 1964)). Of these factors, only the last is
not included in the Restatement or in the factors described in Nationwide. McCon-
nell, supra note 79, at 54; see supra notes 89, 93 and accompanying text (discussing
the Restatement factors and the Nationwide factors).
95. Speaks, 243 N.W.2d at 144.
96. Lewis v. Commissioner, 425 N.W.2d at 309 (holding that home health care
aides are employees for purposes of unemployment benefits) (citing Wise v. Denesen
Insulation Co., 387 N.W.2d 477, 479 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)).
97. Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 919 (1985) (holding that the conduct of the parties, rather than the
existence of an "Independent Contractor's Agreement," determined the status of
homeworkers under the Fair Labor Standards Act); Johnson v. Independent Sch.
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b. Economic Realities Test
Although virtually all federal and state laws utilize some form
of the common law test to distinguish between independent con-
tractors and employees, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and
other wage and hour statutes require that courts apply the eco-
nomic realities test.9 8 The economic realities test examines the
"history, terms or purposes of the legislation" to determine whether
a worker is an employee under a particular statute.99 Under "social
legislation" employees are those who as a matter of economic reality
are dependent upon the business to which they render service.
Statutes that are deemed "social legislation" require application of
the economic realities test. Social legislation encompasses statutes
intended to protect the rights of workers who are dependent upon
their employers for their livelihood.100
The economic realities test measures the economic dependence
of the worker by utilizing factors similar to those of the common law
test.101 The definition of employee under the economic realities
test, however, is broader than the common law test in that it covers
Dist. No. 535, 291 N.W.2d 699, 702 (Minn. 1980); Ossenfort v. Associated Milk
Prods., 254 N.W.2d 672, 677 (Minn. 1977).
98. Karasov, supra note 78, at 12. The economic realities test arose when the
Supreme Court was required to consider the term "employee" under the National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (West 1973 & Supp. 1995). In Nation-
wide, the Supreme Court abandoned the economic realities test for most situations,
holding that courts should presume Congress intended that the common law defini-
tion of employee be applied unless the statute under consideration indicates other-
wise. McConnell, supra note 79, at 52 (citing Nationwide, 503 U.S. at 319). "Under
this analysis, the economic realities test continues to be used under the Fair Labor
Standards Act." Id.
99. Hearst, 322 U.S. at 123.
100. Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947) (applying the economic real-
ities test to the Social Security Act); see also United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704
(1947) (same); Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947) (applying the
economic realities test to the Fair Labor Standards Act).
In other words, the court will consider whether the job is the worker's primary
means to earn a living and whether the policy behind the legislation was social, "in
light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained." Silk, 331 U.S. at
712. The court will also analyze whether the worker is entitled to the legal rights
granted by the statute. Id.
101. These factors include:
(1) the degree of the alleged employer's right to control the manner in
which the work is to be performed; (2) the alleged employee's opportu-
nity for profit or loss depending upon his managerial skill; (3) the al-
leged employee's investment in equipment or materials required for his
task, or his employment of helpers; (4) whether the service rendered
requires a special skill; (5) the degree of permanence of the working
relationship; (6) whether the service rendered is an integral part of the
alleged employer's business.
McConnell, supra note 79, at 52 (citing Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757
F.2d 1376, 1382 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S.
722, 728 (1947) and Donovan v, Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1981)).
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workers who may not qualify under the traditional agency princi-
ples underlying the common law test. Though the degree of control
is not determinative under the economic realities test, it remains a
key factor. Courts occasionally have used a hybrid test, incorporat-
ing elements of the common law and economic realities tests,
thereby focusing on both the right of control over the worker and
the totality of the circumstances of the relationship.1 0 2
D. The Employee/Independent Contractor Distinction in
Sex Industry Employment
1. Which Test Is Applicable to Sex Work?
Courts have considered whether club dancers are employees
in disputes involving wage and hour claims,103 tort liability,104 and
other agency matters. 0 5 Because most statutes require the com-
mon law test, most claims that dancers would bring would require
the court to utilize the common law test to determine whether a
dancer is an employee as a matter of law.106 However, the FLSA
and comparable state laws, i0 7 which establish minimum wage,
overtime, equal pay and child labor requirements for employers, 108
utilize the economic realities test.'0 9 Therefore some claims
brought by dancers will require application of the economic realities
test.
2. Deja Vu (Minneapolis) Litigation
In 1994, about 150 dancers filed suit against the Minneapolis
nightclub Deja Vu to recover back wages under Minnesota's Fair
Labor Standards Act.11o The key issue in the case was whether the
For the Restatement language, which is the foundation for the common law test,
see supra note 89 and accompanying text.
102. McConnell, supra note 79, at 53 (citing Wilde v. County of Kandiyohi, 15
F.3d 103 (8th Cir. 1994)). The hybrid test has been used in employment discrimina-
tion cases. Id.
103. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., Byrne v. Stern, 431 N.E.2d 1073 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (holding that a
dancer was an employee of a club and that the club therefore was liable for liquor
regulation violations when dancer was charged with prostitution).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 89, 91.
107. See MUM. STAT. ANN. §§ 177, 181 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996).
108. 29 U.S.C.A. § 203 (West 1978 & Supp. 1995).
109. McConnell, supra note 79, at 63 (citing Nationwide, 503 U.S. at 327).
110. Panel, supra note 14, at B2. Under the federal FLSA, tip earnings are in-
cluded in determining whether an employee earns minimum wage. 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 207(m) (West 1978 & Supp. 1995). The credit may not exceed 50% of the minimum
wage, even if the employee received more than that in tips. Id. In contrast to the
federal FLSA, Minnesota minimum wage law does not permit a tip credit; employ-
ers must pay employees the minimum wage no matter how much they earn through
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women were legally employees, rather than independent contrac-
tors, under federal and state laws and thus entitled to minimum
wages.", 1 The club owners argued that the women were independ-
ent contractors and signed contracts to perform.11 2 They argued
that the dancers were fully aware of the job requirements and had
no reason to expect additional compensation.113 According to the
club and the club attorneys, the dancers sometimes earned up to
$500 a night from customers' tips.114
In addition to being denied employee rights, dancers testified
that their managers frequently fined dancers, changed schedules
without notice and sometimes demanded sexual favors before
granting time off.115 The club, in turn, contended that the dancers
would not have continued to work there if the conditions were in
fact intolerable. 116
A jury found that the women were entitled to the minimum
wage."17 The two sides ultimately agreed to arbitration to deter-
mine a settlement rather than continue with the jury
proceedings.118
tips. MmiNN. STAT. ANN. § 177.24(2). Thus, depending upon an individual state's
statutory scheme, some dancers will not be able to bring claims for the full minimum
wage because of their tip income.
111. Matt Nelson, 150 Former Dancers Sue Deja Vu: They Say They Deserve Back
Wages as Employees, STAR Tau. (Minneapolis), Sept. 22, 1994, at B2.
112. Id. "According to court documents, dancers signed a 'dancers' lease agree-
ment' with the club, which required the women to pay 30 to 35 percent of their tips to
the club and $5 per shift as a side tip to other dancers." Brunswick, supra note 14, at
B2.
113. Id.
114. Panel, supra note 14, at B2; see supra note 77 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing potential income from nude dancing). Under Minnesota law, tip earnings
are irrelevant in determining whether an employee was properly paid minimum
wage. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
115. Nelson, supra note 14, at B2.
116. Id.
117. Panel, supra note 14, at B2. As reported in the Minneapolis Star Tribune:
As part of a questionnaire, the jurors acknowledged that the dancers
were employees and that they received a salary of at least $250 a week.
The jurors found, though that what the women do does not consti-
tute "invention, imagination or talent" and also contended that they did
not exercise their own judgment in their performances. [Hennepin
County District Judge] Ginsberg imposed a continued gag order on the
proceedings pending the outcome of the deliberations on damages, but
the verdict suggests that jurors found that dancers were told what
hours to work, what costumes to wear and where to work, indicating
that managers had more control over the workers than merely hiring
independent contractors.
Brunswick, supra note 14, at B1.
118. Panel, supra note 14, at B2.
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3. What Other Courts Have Held
Courts are increasingly recognizing that nude dancers and
other sexual entertainers are employees rather than independent
contractors. As such, dancers are beginning to attain their statu-
tory rights and protections as employees through litigation. Judges
are applying principles developed in litigation from other employ-
ment contexts to the question of whether sex industry workers are
employees as a matter of law.
In 1993, the United States Secretary of Labor brought an ac-
tion against a club for violations of the minimum wage, overtime,
and record-keeping provisions of the FLSA.119 Dancers in the club
earned their income solely from customer tips "for performing on
stage and performing private 'table dances' and 'couch dances."120
The club set the dancers' weekly work schedules, enforced costume
requirements, selected performance music, and fined dancers for
rule violations.121 The court, applying the economic realities test,
held that the dancers were employees.122
In a similar case against a Dallas nightclub, a U.S. District
Court, also applying the economic realities test, found that dancers
were employees within the meaning of the FLSA.12 3 The dancers
in this club had signed "independent contractor agreements" before
being hired, provided their own costumes, and paid the club thirty-
five dollars each night for working there.' 24 Their sole source of
income was patron tips for stage and private table dances.125 The
court's decision that the dancers were employees was based on the
dancers' economic dependence upon the club, demonstrated by the
club's degree of control, the dancers' opportunities for profit or loss,
the dancers' investment in the facilities, and the permanency of the
relationship between the parties.1 26
In 1997, the Alaska Department of Labor brought an action on
behalf of a dancer working under contract for a club, alleging that
the club had violated wage and subsistence statutes.' 2 7 The club
required dancers to work eight hour shifts and perform three
dances, the last topless. 128 During the remaining time they solic-
119. Reich v. Circle C. Inv., Inc., 998 F.2d 324, 324 (5th Cir. 1993).
120. Id. at 326.
121. Id. at 327.
122. Id. at 328-29.
123. Martin v. Priba Corp., C.A. No. 3: 91-CV-2786-G, 1992 WL 486911 at *5
(N.D. Tex., Nov. 6, 1992).
124. Id. at *1-2.
125. Id. at *2.
126. Id. at *3.
127. Jeffcoat v. State Dep't of Labor, 732 P.2d 1073, 1073 (Alaska 1987).
128. Id. at 1075.
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ited table dances and drinks.129 Dancers earned all income from
table dances and tips.130 The Supreme Court of Alaska relied upon
the economic realities test131 and considered six specific factors.132
The court found that the dancer was an employee of the defendant
club for purposes of Alaska's labor laws. 133
In addition to granting recovery under wage and hour claims,
courts have recognized that dancers have valid claims of employee
status under other statutes, including workers' compensation134
and liquor regulations. 135
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.; see supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text (discussing the economic
realities test). Because Alaska's labor laws are based on the federal FLSA, Alaska
courts have looked to federal case law for guidance. Jeffcoat, 732 P.2d at 1075; see
supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing the federal FLSA).
132. Jeffcoat, 732 P.2d at 1075-76. The six factors are:
1) the degree of the alleged employer's right to control the manner in
which the work is to be performed; 2) the alleged employee's opportu-
nity for profit or loss depending upon his managerial skill; 3) the al-
leged employee's investment in equipment or materials required for his
task, or his employment of helpers; 4) whether the service rendered re-
quires a special skill; 5) the degree of permanence of the working rela-
tionship; 6) whether the service rendered is an integral part of the
alleged employer's business.
Id. (citing Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376, 1382 (3d Cir. 1985)).
The court utilized these factors with a basic understanding that the FLSA was
designed to protect persons who as a matter of economic reality are dependent upon
the business in which they render service. Id.
133. Id. at 1078.
134. In 1988, the Idaho Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration a decision
by the Industrial Commission, which held that an exotic dancer shot and killed while
leaving the bar where she worked was not covered by workers' compensation. Han-
son v. BCB, Inc., 754 P.2d 444 (Idaho 1988). Analyzing the statutory test, the court
rejected the decision of the Industrial Commission, which had found that she was an
independent contractor rather than an employee of the bar based on the statutory
test. Id. at 445. Section 44.00 of the Idaho Workinen's Cotpnensatiou Law utilizes a
right-of-control test with evidentiary factors including the furnishing of equipment.
Id. at 446. The court found that the Industrial Commission had improperly applied
the "furnishing of equipment" factor in finding that her body was a major item of
equipment. Id. at 447. The court explained that "[mlajor items of equipment include
such things as tools, machinery, special clothing, parts, and other siniflar items nec-
essary for the worker to accomplish the task to be performed." Id. The court noted
that the fact that a plumber supplies his body whether he is working as an employee
or as an independent contractor. Id.
It is worth noting that the Industrial Commission deemed the dancer's body to
be a piece of equipment-a material commodity rather than something essentially
human. Id.; see also id. at 448 (McFadden, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the deci-
sion of the Industrial Commission and arguing that the majority's reasoning is "ludi-
crous when applied to an exotic dancer's body when she is engaged in her dancing
before the patrons of a saloon as in this case, and as found by the commission").
135. The Illinois Appellate Court held a bar owner accountable for the acts of a
dancer charged with soliciting prostitution and thus affirmed the revocation of his
liquor license pursuant to Illinois law. Byrne v. Stern, 431 N.E.2d 1073 (Ill. App. Ct.
1981). "[Tlhe [Illinois] Liquor Control Act imposes strict liability upon the licensee
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H. Sex Industry Workers Are Employees as a
Matter of Law
Women working as dancers in the sex industry are employees
as a matter of law, under both the common law and the economic
realities tests. As employees they should be entitled to the corre-
sponding legal rights and protections.
A. Dancers Meet Definition of Employee Under Common
Law Test
Dancers meet the requirements of the common law test for
employees.136 In Minnesota, the determining factors are: (1) the
right to control the means and manner of performance; (2) the mode
of payment; (3) the furnishing of material or tools; (4) the control of
the premises where the work is done; and (5) the right of the em-
ployer to discharge.137
1. Club's Control Over Dancers
The key issue in finding employee status under the common
law test is the employer's level of control over the worker.138 The
for all violations of the act by the licensee's agents or employees." Id. at 1076 (citing
ILL. REV. STAT. 1977, ch. 43, para. 185 (1977)). The court based its decision on a
presumption of employee status and found that the defendant did not present any
evidence to rebut this presumption. Id. The court stated:
The performance of work by one party is prima facie evidence of em-
ployment and, in the absence of contrary evidence, supports a presump-
tion that that the person is a servant.... There is no dispute in this
case that Ms. Spasic performed work as a dancer for defendant. During
the hearing, defendant did not present any evidence to rebut the pre-
sumption that Ms. Spasic was anything but an employee. For our re-
view of the report of proceedings, it appears that the parties to the
hearing viewed Ms. Spasic as an employee and not otherwise. There-
fore, it was reasonable under the facts and circumstances of this case to
consider the dancer as an employee for purposes of the proceedings.
Id. (citations omitted).
136. See supra part I.C.2.a. (defining the common law test).
137. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court outlined a
more comprehensive list of factors in Nationwide. 503 U.S. 318 (1992). This article
utilizes the more abbreviated Minnesota test to illustrate how dancers meet the com-
mon law test. Factors in the Nationwide test that are not in the Minnesota test
include: the skill required; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship
between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional
projects to the hired party; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants;
whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the
tax treatment of the hired party. Id. at 323-24. Some of these factors are addressed
below in the discussion of relevant inquiries in the economic realities test. See, e.g.,
infra notes 165-67 and accompanying text (noting that no special skill is required for
nude dancing); see also supra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing how em-
ployees and independent contractors are treated differently for tax purposes).
138. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
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number and extent of rules imposed by clubs over the dancers they
hire indicates a significant degree of control.
A club typically will set up dancers' work schedules. 139 Danc-
ers are not permitted to choose when they will work. The club,
rather, controls when dancers will earn their income. By setting a
schedule, a club coordinates its own needs and ensures that it will
always have performers available for patrons.
Further, a club has significant control over the specifics of
dancers' performances. A club generally requires dancers to per-
form a certain number of stage dances each night and to bring in a
certain amount of income through table dances and couch dances at
a set rate per dance. 140 Though the club may not control the exact
dance moves performers use, it generally provides the music and
the stage.' 4 ' The club, therefore, is able to control key elements of
the dancers' performances by selecting certain types of music and
setting the stage in particular ways.
A club may also require its dancers to provide their own cos-
tumes, but typically it has regulations as to what constitutes an
appropriate costume and thus exercises control over what dancers
wear. 142 A club typically controls dancers' behavior on the job
through other restrictive rules, including when they are allowed to
use the restroom.143 In sum, dancers are subject to heavy control
by club management and thus meet this element of the common law
test.
2. Mode of Payment
Dancers typically are not paid an hourly wage, but rather earn
all their income through customer tips.144 Such a method of pay-
ment seems at first glance to suggest independent contractor status
rather than that of employee. Nonetheless, evidence regarding how
dancers are paid, though probative of the issue as to whether they
are employees under the common law test, is not conclusive. In-
stead the court must weigh all factors, with the greatest attention
paid to the level of control a hiring party has over the worker. It is
also worth noting that many workers, such as restaurant servers,
who clearly are employees under the law, receive a significant per-
centage of their income through customer tips.
139. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. See also Jeffcoat v. State
Dep't of Labor, 732 P.2d 1073, 1076 (Alaska 1987).
143. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 60, 64 and accompanying text.
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3. Investment in Materials or Tools
Typical independent contractors furnish equipment or materi-
als to accomplish their tasks.145 Nude dancers, like typical employ-
ees, have little or no investment in equipment or materials to
perform their jobs. Under the economic realities test, this indicates
that dancers are employees rather than independent
contractors. 14 6
Dancers typically provide their own costumes and toiletries in
accordance with club rules. 147 However, these minimal investment
requirements do not rise to the level required to indicate independ-
ent contractor status.148
Dancers, of course, may invest in additional materials such as
expensive costumes, or incur costs for expenses like breast enlarge-
ment, that increase their overall personal investment in their work.
However, their primary "equipment" requirement is themselves,
their exposed bodies, and this does not constitute "equipment"
under the meaning of the test. 149
4. Control of Premises Where Work is Done
In conjunction with the right to control the means and manner
in which dancers perform their duties at a club, the club owner re-
tains control over the actual premises. As discussed below in the
analysis of the economic realities test, dancers have no interest in
the operations or manageinent of the clubs in which they perform.
Rather, the clubs are controlled by owners, and dancers are simply
hired to perform there. This arrangement, where dancers have no
role in controlling the premises where their work occurs, indicates
that the dancers are employees under the common law test.
5. Employer's Right to Discharge
The existence of a hiring party's right to discharge a worker at
will indicates that the worker is an employee, rather than an in-
dependent contractor.150 This criterion seems to reflect the same
principles as the first factor of the common law test, which consid-
ers the level of control a hiring party has over a worker. A club
145. For example, a plumber hired to fix a sink would bring necessary tools with
him or her.
146. Reich v. Circle C. Inv., Inc., 998 F.2d 327, 328 (5th Cir. 1993).
147. See supra note 69 and accompanying text; Interview with Kelly Holsopple,
supra note 44.
148. Reich, 998 F.2d at 328 ("dancer's investment in costumes ... is relatively
minor to the considerable investment [the club has madel").
149. See Hanson v. BCB, Inc., 754 P.2d 444 (Idaho 1988).
150. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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owner's control over the club premises and the dancers performing
there includes the right to discharge them at will.151 If a club
owner is dissatisfied with the performance of a dancer or if she fails
to comply with the oftentimes extensive club rules, the owner has
the authority to discharge her from her work at the club. Such au-
thority further points to the conclusion that dancers are employees
as a matter of law pursuant to the common law test.
B. Dancers Meet Definition of Employee under Economic
Realities Test
Under the economic realities test (the test required by the
FLSA),152 dancers at sexually-oriented clubs meet the definition of
employee. They are therefore entitled to the legal protections and
rights afforded by legislation.1 5 3 In the claim brought by former
Deja Vu dancers in Minneapolis, the jury correctly found that the
dancers were employees. 154 As such, these dancers were entitled to
back wages to compensate them for being denied their legal right to
a minimum wage under applicable laws during their tenure.15 5
The economic realities test seeks to protect workers who are
dependent upon their employers to make a living.156 Dancers ex-
hibit strong dependence on their club-employers based on the fol-
lowing factors: (1) the club's control over the dancers' work; (2) the
dancers' opportunity for profit or loss depending upon their own
managerial skill; (3) the dancers' investment in equipment or
materials; (4) the special skill required in dancing; (5) the degree of
permanence of the relationship between dancers and the club; and
(6) the degree to which nude dancing is an integral part of the al-
leged employer's business. 15 7
1. Dancers Are Under Club's Control
The number and specificity of typical club rules demonstrate
that clubs heavily control the nude dancers they hire. The club's
control over dancers is discussed above as one of the factors in the
151. Interview with Kelly Holsopple, supra note 44.
152. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
153. Id.
154. Brunswick, supra note 14, at B1.
155. The club ultimately settled this suit, rather than have a court determine
damages to be awarded. Panel, supra note 14, at B2. These dancers were entitled to
seek recovery for unpaid minimum wages despite their allegedly high tip income
because Minnesota minimum wage law does not include earnings through customer
tips. See supra note 110.
156. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
157. These factors are delineated in Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d
1376, 1382 (3d Cir. 1985). See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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common law test.15s This level of control exceeds the control re-
quired to satisfy the economic realities test, as well.
Under the economic realities test, a worker is an employee
when the hiring party retains control over the means and manner
of work rather than merely a concern over the ultimate product. 159
Independent contractors are typically hired to complete a specific
task, and the hiring party is not interested in the process used to
accomplish the result.160 The club's control over the process of
dancers performing, therefore, suggests that club owners are not
concerned with the result of dancers' work, but with the process.
This focus indicates that the dancers are working as employees,
rather than independent contractors.161
2. Dancers Have No Role in Economic Enterprise
Unlike typical independent contractors, dancers exhibit no en-
trepreneurial characteristics. They are dependent on the club to
develop a successful economic enterprise. Dancers' opportunities
for profit or loss are not dependent upon their own managerial
skills. Under the economic realities test, this indicates that dancers
are employees of the clubs for which they work. 162
Dancers depend on clubs to make income available to them.
The club controls all meaningful aspects of the business. It handles
the advertising and promotion, without which the dancers would
not have an audience to pay them tips. Dancers would be unable to
overcome a club's inability to manage its business. Furthermore,
dancers' efforts to perform well do not demonstrate a role in the
club's economic enterprise. Even employees can earn increased in-
come through good work performance. An effort toward good work
performance is not sufficient to indicate a role in the economic en-
terprise. Dancers' only real opportunity to increase their earnings
is through an increase in tips from customers. Employees in any
profession where income is earned through customer tips could seek
to improve their performance to earn more tip revenue, and this
would not alter their status as employees. 163 Courts look instead
for characteristics such as innovative business skill and initiative to
158. See supra part II.A.1.
159. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
160. For example, when a plumber is hired to fix a sink, the hiring party is pre-
sumably more interested in the end result (the repaired sink) than the process by
which the work is accomplished.
161. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
162. See Id.; Reich v. Circle C. Inv., Inc., 998 F.2d 324, 328 (5th Cir. 1993).
163. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 66, at 15; see Jeffcoat v. State Dep't of
Labor, 732 P.2d 1073, 1076-77 (Alaska 1987).
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overcome this element of the economic realities test.164 Thus, nude
dancers are appropriately deemed employees under this aspect of
the test, as well.
3. Dancers Have Little or No Investment in Equipment
or Materials
As discussed above under the common law factors, dancers
have a minimal investment in the necessary materials with which
they work. Therefore, pursuant to the economic realities test, they
are employees rather than independent contractors.
4. Nude Dancing Requires No Special Skill
Typical independent contractors market their services in a
special skill and use this skill to complete a task for which they are
hired. In contrast, no special skill is required for performing in the
sex industry; in fact, typical advertisements for dancing provide
that no experience is necessary.165
In fact, the only real requirement for nude dancing seems to be
female anatomy. 166 Of course, a secondary requirement is simply a
willingness 167 to perform the work, to remove clothing as required
by the club, to dance the required number of dances, and to meet
the club's income quota. Basic compliance with job requirements
does not rise to the level of special skills indicative of independent
contractor work. Thus nude dancing indicates employee status
under the economic realities test.
5. Permanence of the Relationship
A long-term relationship between the hiring party and the
worker is another factor that can indicate economic dependence
pursuant to the economic realities test.16 8 An independent contrac-
164. See Martin v. Priba Corp., C.A. No. 3:91-CV-2786-G, 1992 WL 486911 at *4
(N.D. Tex., Nov. 6, 1992) (finding that the scope of the dancers' initiative was limited
to decisions regarding choice of costumes to wear or the provocativeness of the dance
performance, and that such initiative is consistent with that of an employee, rather
than an independent contractor).
165. See supra note 52 and accompanying text; see also Jeffcoat, 732 P.2d at 1077
('The Club... hired dancers without knowing whether or not they had danced previ-
ously. Apparently the skill required for topless dancing was slight.").
166. See Interview with Kelly Holsopple, supra note 44. 'This does not take any
talent... if you can bend over, you got it." Id.
167. Such "willingness" is largely illusory in light of the extensive factors that
contribute to the use of women in the sex industry and prostitution. See supra notes
4, 6; Garb, supra note 35, at 294 n.76.
168. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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tor is more likely to work for a number of parties and move from job
to job. 169
The permanence of the relationship between club and dancer
seems to vary. Dancers indicate that their relationship with a club
can become all-consuming.170 On the other hand, a club may ex-
plicitly state that dancers may perform elsewhere, indicating an
impermanent relationship. 171 However, courts are required under
the economic realities test to weigh the factors evenly; no one factor
is determinative. 172 Even the potential impermanence of the rela-
tionship between dancers and the club hiring them is not sufficient
to find that the dancers are working as independent contractors,
particularly when other factors of the economic realities test indi-
cate that they are employees.
6. Dancers Are Integral Part of Employer's Business
The final aspect of economic dependence in the economic reali-
ties inquiry is the workers' role in the hiring party's business.173
An employee will likely play a central role in the employer's
enterprise.
Dancers at sexually-oriented clubs are clearly an integral part
of such clubs' business. The primary focus of such facilities is to
provide live entertainment by partially or fully nude female danc-
ers. 174 Though most of these clubs are also bars, alcohol is not the
169. For example, a plumber will move from home to home, doing a different job
at each location, and his or her relationship with each homeowner will not rise to the
level of employee and employer. See Dwyer, supra note 61, at 90.
170. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. Holsopple attested that a dancer
typically finds herself giving a significant number of hours to the club each week.
Interview with Kelly Holsopple, supra note 44.
171. See Martin v. Priba Corp. C.A. No. 3:91-CV-2786-G, 1992 WL 486911 at *5
(N.D. Tex., Nov. 6, 1992). Holsopple said that a patron will see the same dancers at
all clubs and venues in a given market, indicating that many work at more than one
facility. Interview with Kelly Holsopple, supra note 44 and accompanying text. On
a national level, dancers often travel from club to club, traveling the strip circuit to
perform. Id. In this context, they may be under the control of an agent or manager
who essentially is their pimp. Id.
172. See supra note 101; Reich v. Circle C. Inv., Inc., 998 F.2d at 327, 328-39 (5th
Cir. 1993) ("The transient nature of the work force is not enough here to remove the
dancers from the protections of the FLSA.").
173. See supra note 101.
174. As stated in plaintiffs' court documents in the Minneapolis Deja Vu case,
"[Deja Vul would not exist but for the 'beautiful, friendly, sexiest showgirls found
anywhere in the world.'" Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 66, at 17. "For [Deja
Vul to suggest that the nude dancers are merely complimentary and/or peripheral to
their real business of selling soft drinks and fruit juices is simply ludicrous." Id. at
16. Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum of Law at 16, Davis v. Deja Vu, (D. Minn.
1994) (No. CT 92-010727); see also Jeffcoat v. State Dep't of Labor, 732 P.2d 1073,
1077 (Alaska 1987).
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primary focus of their business. This is demonstrated by the
number of clubs that feature nude dancers and thus are forbidden
by the laws of their jurisdictions from serving alcoholic bever-
ages. 175 Without the services that dancers provide, the clubs would
be forced to change their focus or risk losing business entirely.176
These club owners clearly are dependent on the availability of ex-
otic dancers.
C. Ramifications and Analysis of this Conclusion
1. Opening Legal Doors to "Throwaway" Women
Granting sex workers their rights as employees will have an
immediate impact on their lives. For example, legal acknowledg-
ment will offer sex workers greater protection on the job. They will
be able to file sexual harassment suits under Title VII the next time
their supervisor demands sexual favors before granting time off
work.17 7 They will be able to unionize and collectively bargain with
their employers for more favorable terms and conditions of employ-
ment.1 78 They will be entitled to minimum wages. 179
Opening legal doors for sex workers will serve to acknowledge
a group of women too long deemed "throwaway" human beings.
Like traditional prostitutes, women working in the legal sex indus-
try have been treated as though they are not entitled to the same
legal protections as other "socially accepted" workers. While the in-
equity in the sex industry reflects overall economic disadvantages
endured by women, 8 0 it also reflects American ambivalence toward
sex work. As American society simultaneously supports and con-
demns the sex industry, it has marginalized and forgotten the wo-
men involved. Prostituted women and women working in the legal
sex industry are essentially "thrown away."' 8 '
Feminists, in their own mixed responses to sex work, 182 have
also contributed to an effective dismissal of sex workers. Feminists
175. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
176. This assumes, of course, that most sexually-oriented club patrons do not fre-
quent these facilities because of their beverage selection.
177. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. Of course, in light of the fact that
sex workers are routinely sexually harassed by club owners and patrons alike, it
would be interesting to see how a court would handle such a claim. Interview with
Kelly Holsopple, supra note 44.
178. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing the "throwaway wo-
man" phenomenon).
182. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text (discussing differences in femi-
nist thought about sex work and the appropriate legal approaches to it).
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have forgotten sex workers and neglected to acknowledge that sex
workers are people, citizens entitled to the same legal rights and
protections as workers in "straight" jobs.
The underlying social tensions will not be eliminated by grant-
ing sex workers the legal protections and rights to which they are
entitled. However, addressing these tensions is a task beyond sim-
ple repair. On the other hand, the legal system has laws in place
establishing rights and protections for employees, as well as the
factors to determine whether workers are employees. Available
legal remedies could make a significant difference in the lives of sex
workers.
2. The Dangers of Legitimization and Partial Reform
Despite the immediate benefits that would be available to sex
workers by affirming their status as employees, providing legal pro-
tection in sex work has drawbacks. Specifically, it fails to acknowl-
edge the inherently degrading and dehumanizing character of the
industry and in fact further supports its legitimacy as a commercial
venture. Furthermore, granting sex workers rights as employees is
only a partial response to the harm of working in the sex industry
and may impede comprehensive reform.
Elevating the status of sex industry work to an employment
relationship neglects to address its sexually exploitative nature.
Through legitimization, the legal system may send a message to
American girls that sex work is a socially acceptable option for
earning a living. This contradicts a central focus for many femi-
nists: the desire that girls grow up knowing that they are more
than sex objects, that they deserve respect and attention for more
than their sexuality.
By legally legitimizing sex work, the government is authorized
to collect taxes on sex employees.' 8 3 For feminists who view legal
sex work as akin to illegal prostitution,1 8 4 governmental authority
to collect taxes based on sexual exploitation effectively places the
government in the role of pimp.18 5 The benefits and rights accorded
women working in the sex industry through legal determinations of
employee status would permit the government to profit from the
perpetuation of men's sexual access to a class of women. This is a
drawback that mandates serious consideration.
183. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
185. "The legal definition of pimping is living off the earnings of a prostitute.'"
Alexander, supra note 30, at 198.
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Many may protest litigation on behalf of sex workers out of a
concern that an acceptance of partial reform will come at the ex-
pense of ignoring the overall problem of the inherent exploitation of
the sex industry.186 Such a concern is also meritorious and de-
serves further analysis.1 s 7
3. Employee Rights for Dancers is a Desirable Goal
Despite valid concerns about legitimizing the industry and the
dangers of partial reform, the benefits of fighting for employee sta-
tus for sex workers outweigh the costs. Regulation of the industry
may help to clean it up and minimize the abuses occurring within
it. 188 Legal attention to the industry forces club owners to be more
accountable for their illegal activities.
Until further analysis of the dangers of legitimization and par-
tial reform is available, established law could make a significant
difference in the lives of nude dancers. Sex workers meet the appli-
cable standards of employee status, and thus should be granted the
rights and protections of employees. The problem of the exploita-
tive sex industry can be partially addressed through available law.
Marginalized and forgotten sex workers will benefit from judicial
recognition of their rights.
The greatest benefit for affording legal recognition to sex
workers is that it will help the women exploited by the sex indus-
try. 189 Granting sex workers the rights and protections to which
they are legally entitled would immediately make a difference in
their lives. The importance of this goal should not be minimized.
Conclusion
Women who work in the legal sex industry are denied rights
and protections to which they are entitled. Though hired ostensibly
as independent contractors, dancers' relationships with club owners
indicate that they are employees under both common law and the
186. Partial reform raises the concern that some levels of exploitation will be seen
as acceptable. Only full reform supports the notion that the industry per se is unac-
ceptable exploitation.
187. It is, of course, difficult to conceive of the dangers of partial reform without
the benefit of hindsight. Such hindsight has been useful in reconsidering the philos-
ophy behind the past twenty years of rape law reform. See Henderson, supra note
43, at 43-50 (describing the historical and philosophical development of rape law).
188. This is not to disregard the inherent abuses of the industry. See supra notes
186-87 and accompanying text (considering this danger with partial reform).
189. "Until the legal community opens the doors of justice to prostituted women,
they will continue to 'stand alone at the side of the road.'" Giobbe & Gibel, supra
note 41, at 56.
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economic realities test. Litigation on behalf of sex workers will help
to remedy a portion of the injustice they endure.
Many may protest such litigation for sex workers' rights in
recognition of the harms inherent in such work; granting dancers
their rights as employees may be a band-aid solution to a gaping
wound. However, the workplace rights of individual citizens can be
attained while simultaneously fighting the conditions that create a
culture where women are subordinated and sexually exploited. At
the very least, affirming dancers' rights as employees will temper
the harm and give them a legal voice in addressing workplace
wrongs. Such small battles may be fought without forgetting the
greater fight.
As one former dancer said, "We're not fighting for the money
... we're fighting for human rights and respect every paid worker
gets."19o Such acknowledgment is hardly too much to ask.
190. Nelson, supra note 111, at B2 (quoting Julie Chavira, age 23, of
Minneapolis).
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